You really can't say anything about strategic voting here? At all? Let's suppose I receive 50, 75, or 90 utils for attending school A, B, or C respectively (or 0 for not attending any). At a minimum, I should rate A at 0 and C at 100 to maximize incentive to be assigned to the school of my choice. If I knew that C was extremely selective and I was unlikely to get in, it would be strategically sound for me to assign many points to it (rather than simply scaling up the difference) rather than honestly/naively reporting my true preference. Exactly how many points depends on the chance I think I'd get in, but it's not unreasonable to expect that I would want to assign 99 or 100 points to it. On the other hand, suppose I would receive -10, -5, or 100 utils for attending A, B, or C (or 0 for not attending any). Then I should rate them at 0, 0, and 100 points, since I am truly indifferent to A and B (I wouldn't go if accepted). A voting method that can't handle strategic voting is a bad method. Sure, we know complete strategyproof-ness is impossible (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975) but that doesn't mean (1) that tactical voting doesn't exist or (2) that we shouldn't plan for it. Charles Greathouse Analyst/Programmer Case Western Reserve University On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 3:08 PM, Warren D Smith <warren.wds@gmail.com> wrote:

...

From: Charles Greathouse <charles.greathouse@case.edu> What is the correct tactical strategy? Surely this is known...

--au contraire. There is in general no such thing as an "optimum strategy" for an N-player game if N>2. So not only is it not known, it is probably not even defined.

(And that's for both the marriage and ratings versions of the problem.)

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